The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5,[182][183][184][185][186][187][188][189][190][191][192][193][194][195][196][197][198][199][200][201]. The exploration of a specic class of Markov perfect equilibria in these dynamic tournament games yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We nd that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
Introduction
A weak tournament is a pair of a nite set of alternatives and an asymmetric binary relation. When the latter is total as well as asymmetric, the pair is referred to as a tournament. These denitions are entirely general tournaments arise in many areas (sports, preference-driven choice, biometrics, . . . ) but a specic interpretation is used by social choice theorists who think of the binary relation as the majority preference relation of a group of voters on the set of alternatives. In concert with this interpretation, majority voting is often viewed as choosing from a weak tournament, the winning alternatives (or Condorcet winners) being those that are maximal with respect to the binary relation.
The diculty with using this approach to predict majority-voting outcomes lies in the fact that the majority preference relation may have no maximal element; that is, there may be no alternative that defeats or ties all other alternatives.
Social choice theorists have devoted considerable attention to problems associated with the construction of nonempty choice sets from weak tournaments. 1 One approach, initiated by Laond et al. (1993) , has been to apply game-theoretic equilibrium concepts to a special class of two-player zero-sum games, called tournament games. Given a weak tournament T = (X, R), the players in the corresponding tournament game are two ocemotivated candidates who compete in an election by choosing policy platforms from the set of alternatives X. If one candidate's choice beats the other's according to relation R then her payo is 1 and the other's is −1. Otherwise, both receive payos of 0. If T is a tournament, the bipartisan set of T is the support of the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game (Laond et al., 1993) . For any weak tournament T , Dutta and Laslier (1999) dene the essential set of T as the support of the unique mixed strategy equilibrium with maximal support. Le Breton (1996, 2001 ) also construct choice sets for weak tournaments by applying Shapley's saddles to the corresponding tournament games.
Our aim in this note is to propose a solution that would account for a dierent form 1 This short note is not the place for a full review of the dierent solution sets that have been proposed for tournaments and weak tournaments. The reader is referred to Moulin (1986) , Dutta (1988 ), Laslier (1997 , Peris and Subiza (1999) , and Hudry (2009) for exhaustive accounts of this literature. 2 of stability in tournament games: policy persistence. The motivation for this new solution derives from the large and growing literature on convergence and stability in dynamic models of electoral competition, dating back to the seminal work of Kramer (1977) . 2 To any tournament T = (X, R), we thus associate dynamic adaptations of the static tournament game described above. In particular, in order to study dynamic stability we assume that in any period: (i) the challenger can choose any platform from X, while the incumbent is bound to her previous choice; and (ii) a set of farsighted and rational voters/players, whose majority preference relation on X is R, decide to retain or to replace the incumbent.
Evidently, one can contrive many electorates underlying the majority relation R and, therefore, many dynamic tournament games corresponding to T . We concentrate on stationary Markov perfect equilibria of these games when voters are farsighted, and dene a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. An A-stable set of T is a subset Y of X with the following property: every dynamic tournament game corresponding to T has an absorbing equilibrium such that the set of alternatives implemented in the absorbing states of this equilibrium is precisely Y . Put dierently, each alternative in an A-stable set satises the following stability condition: every dynamic tournament game has an equilibrium in which the rst candidate oering this alternative gains oce and will remain there, reenacting the same alternative in all subsequent periods.
While the A-stable set solution seeks to impose new stability criteria, it is not unrelated to existent theory and, as a matter of fact, not new at all. We indeed establish that it is equivalent to a famed cooperative solution von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our method of formulating A-stable sets by using stationary Markov perfect equilibria of dynamic tournament games. Section 3 then establishes the equivalence between A-stable sets and vNM stable sets. Section 4 discusses the implications of our analysis and concludes the note. The appendix contains the proofs of our results.
Notation and Denitions Weak Tournaments, Electorates and Repeated Elections
A weak tournament is a pair T = (X, R), where X is a nite set of alternatives (or vertices), and R is an asymmetric binary relation on X. T is a tournament if R is complete as well as asymmetric. One way to think about weak tournaments is to consider 3 For an exception, see Brandt et al. (2009) . 4 Existence and uniqueness of vNM stable sets in voting games is discussed in Muto (1984) , and Le Breton and Weber (1992) .
5 Dierent cooperative and noncooperative interpretations of vNM stable sets in the context of committee voting are oered in Anesi (2006 Anesi ( , 2009 .
the relation R as being related to the views of an electorate regarding alternatives in X:
the expression xRy represents the statement x is majority-preferred to y. (Although R ⊆ X 2 , we adopt the usual convention of writing xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R throughout this note.)
Formally, given a weak tournament
. . , n} is a nite set of voters;
The weak tournament T with a T -electorate (N, u) denes a dynamic game of Downsian electoral competition Γ, which we refer to as a dynamic T -game. Specically, the players in Γ are two candidates, labeled α and β, and the n voters in N , who participate in an innite sequence of elections. Following each history, period t begins under the shadow of an ongoing state s t−1 = ι t−1 , x t−1 , in place from the previous period : ι t−1 ∈ {α, β} is the candidate elected in period t − 1 (and therefore the incumbent at the start of period t); x t−1 ∈ X is the policy the latter implemented once elected and, by assumption, must also defend in the upcoming election. 6 In the period-t election, the challenger c ∈ {α, β}, c = ι t−1 , announces a policy platform y freely chosen from X. Faced with a choice between alternatives y and x t−1 , each voter i chooses to vote for one or other of the two candidates.
If the proportion of voters casting ballots for the incumbent is at least 1/2, then the incumbent wins the election and ι t , x t = ι t−1 , x t−1 ; otherwise challenger c wins, and
The pair s t = ι t , x t thus becomes the state at the start of period t + 1.
This process continues ad innitum. The initial state, s 0 , is chosen by Nature according to some probability measure ℘ on S ≡ ({α, β} × X) such that ℘ ({s}) > 0 for every s ∈ S.
In every period t, once alternative x t has been implemented, every voter i receives an instantaneous payo (1 − δ i ) u i x t , where δ i ∈ (0, 1) is her discount factor. Thus, voter 6 Originally put forward by Downs (1957) and rst formalized by Kramer (1977) and Wittman (1977) , this assumption is extensively discussed in Bendor et al. (2006) , who propose a dierent interpretation.
Each candidate c ∈ {α, β} is solely motivated by winning oce, so that c's instantaneous payo in period t is representable by (1 − δ c ) π c ι t , where δ c ∈ (0, 1) is her discount factor and
Hence, candidate c's payo from a sequence of states
For any weak tournament T , let G(T ) be the set of dynamic T -games; that is, the set of dynamic tournament games induced by T -electorates.
Strategies
Let T be a weak tournament, and let Γ ∈ G(T ) be induced by (N, u) . A history at some stage of Γ describes all that has transpired in the previous periods and stages (the sequence of incumbents and challengers, their respective platforms and the associated pattern of votes). In general, a (behavior) strategy σ l for player l ∈ {α, β} ∪ N is a mapping that assigns a probability distribution over intended actions (what platform to announce, how to vote) to all conceivable histories at which l is active. Since more detailed notation is required only for stationary Markov pure strategies in what follows, we shed unneeded generality and provide a formal denition only of such strategies.
For each c ∈ {α, β}, let σ c ∈ X S denote c's strategy and, for each (ι, x) ∈ S, let σ c (ι, x) be the alternative oered by candidate c in state (ι, x), with the restriction that σ c (ι, x) = x whenever ι = c. A strategy for voter i ∈ N is denoted by σ i ∈ {α, β} S×X where, for every is convergent.
The set of absorbing states of σ is then dened as A(σ) ≡ {s ∈ S : τ σ (s) = s}, where τ σ ∈ S S is the (deterministic) transition process engendered by σ.
7 Owing to Nature randomizing over the initial state s 0 , this distribution is not degenerate.
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Equilibrium and Stability
Following the previous literature, our main focus will be on stage-undominated stationary Markov perfect equilibria (SMPEs) in pure strategies, i.e., pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria with the following two properties: (i) all players use stationary Markov strategies;
and (ii) at any voter history no voter uses a dominated strategy (Baron and Kalai, 1993) .
And because our goal is to formulate choices sets from weak tournaments with dynamic noncooperative foundations, we further restrict attention to a class of farsighted SMPEs.
Denition 1. Let T be a weak tournament, and let Γ ∈ G(T ). A strategy prole σ is a farsighted equilibrium of Γ if and only if: (i) σ is absorbing; and (ii) there exists a threshold δ 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that σ is a pure strategy stage-undominated SMPE of Γ whenever
A strategy prole is absorbing if the sequence of states it engenders ultimately settles down (instead of cycling). An absorbing strategy prole is a farsighted equilibrium if it is a pure strategy stage-undominated SMPE under the presumption that voters can (and do) anticipate further changes when they decide to replace the current incumbent.
Farsighted equilibria thus provide a new method, with a noncooperative notion of farsighted stability, of formulating choices sets from every weak tournament T . We are particularly interested in sets of the form
where σ is a farsighted equilibrium in some Γ ∈ G(T ).
Denition 2. Let T = (X, R) be a weak tournament. We say that a nonempty set Y ⊆ X is an A-stable set of T if and only if, for all Γ ∈ G(T ), there exists a farsighted equilibrium
The class of A-stable sets of T is denoted by A(T ). Every element Y ∈ A(T ) exhibits
strong stability properties: For any dynamic T -game, there exists a farsighted equilibrium in which each alternative in Y has a positive probability of being selected by a challenger (or Nature), and, when it is selected, it remains as the policy in all subsequent periods. 8
Once a policy in Y has been enacted, there is no other alternative and no majority coalition in favor of changing (with the farsighted implications factored in) the prevailing policy to that alternative. In this sense, A-stability accounts for policy persistence. The analysis of A-stable sets is the subject matter of the next section.
Farsighted Equilibrium Outcomes and A-Stable Sets
Our next step is to characterize A-stable sets, and in so doing connect this new solution to classical notions in cooperative game theory. It is useful to begin by recalling the denition of a vNM stable set for weak tournaments. A vNM stable set of weak tournament (X, R)
is a nonempty subset V of X satisfying the following two conditions:
These two conditions are called internal stability and external stability, respectively. The class of vNM stable sets of a weak tournament T is denoted by V(T ). Our rst result states that any element of V(T ) must be an A-stable set of T .
Proposition 1. Let T be a weak tournament. Every vNM stable set of T is an A-stable set of T ; that is, V(T ) ⊆ A(T ).
This result immediately prompts the following question: Is the converse also true?
Were the answer yes, the class of vNM stable sets would completely characterize the class of A-stable sets of every weak tournament. The following lemma is a rst step to demonstrating that this is actually the case.
Lemma 1. Let T be a weak tournament. The following is true in every Γ ∈ G(T ): if σ is a stage-undominated SMPE of Γ such that S(σ) = ∅, then S(σ) satises internal stability in T .
8 The A-stable set as a concept of dynamic stability resembles in spirit the concept of dynamically stable state which Acemoglu et al. (2008) introduce in a dynamic bargaining setting.
An immediate implication of this lemma is that, for any T = (X, R), A(T ) is a subset
of the class of internally stable subsets of X (given R). Showing that it is also a subset of the class of externally stable subsets of X uses the following fact.
Lemma 2. Let T be a weak tournament. The following is true in every Γ ∈ G(T ): if σ is a farsighted equilibrium of Γ such that S(σ) = ∅, then S(σ) satises external stability in T .
By denition, every farsighted equilibrium path must eventually converge to some absorbing set. Lemma 2 states that this absorbing set must satisfy external stability. Combined with Denition 1, this lemma thus shows that every A-stable set satises external stability. By denition of a vNM stable set, we thus obtain the following Proposition 2. Let T be a weak tournament. Every A-stable set of T is a vNM stable set
that is, A(T ) ⊆ V(T ).
Considered together, Propositions 1 and 2 establish the equivalence between A-stable and vNM stable sets. This is formally stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. Let T = (X, R) be a weak tournament. A set of alternatives Y ⊆ X is an
A-stable set of T if and only if it is a vNM stable set of T ; that is, A(T ) = V(T ).

Implications
This note uncovers new properties of the vNM solution in weak tournaments using a traditional methodology based on tournament games (Laond et al., 1993) . As described in Section 2, the static tournament game needs rst to be amended to account for both dynamic stability and farsighted behavior. We then formulate a solution concept satisfying the criteria of absorption and durability in all the dynamic tournament games thus obtained. Our analysis reveals that the vNM solution is the only solution that meets these criteria. Apart from benchmarking the concept of A-stable set, this result is of independent interest because it reveals new properties of vNM stable sets, which go beyond the internal and external stability criteria.
Another notable implication is the following. As explained in the introduction, it has been fairly common among political scientists to regard the vNM solution as inappropriate for predictive purposes in the context of voting (as in weak tournaments); the main reason for this being the absence of a behavioral rationale underlying its denition. Providing noncooperative foundations for vNM stable sets, this note can be seen as a response to this skeptical view: Alternatives in vNM stable sets constitute absorbing and durable policy outcomes in an important class of dynamic electoral competition games.
Appendix
In a dynamic tournament game, each pure strategy Markov strategy prole σ induces a transition function τ σ ∈ S S and, with it, a continuation payo from each state (ι, x) ∈ S for every player. This payo is given by
for each voter i ∈ N , and by
for each candidate c ∈ {α, β}.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let T be a weak tournament, and let V ∈ V(T ). To prove the proposition, we need to show that for every Γ ∈ G(T ) with electorate (N, u), there exists δ 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that the following statement is true whenever min i∈N δ i > δ 0 : There is an absorbing pure strategy
Consider an arbitrary Γ ∈ G T . We rst dene σ * and δ 0 . Let f be a function in
f (x) ∈ {y ∈ V : yRx}. Since V satises external stability, such a function must exist.
The stationary Markov strategy prole σ * is then dened as follows. At the platformannouncement stage of every period starting with state (ι, x), candidate c's strategy is as follows:
At the voting stage of every period with state (x, ι), each voter i plays as follows
if y = f (x), and
Inspection of the denition of σ * reveals that that it is absorbing and S (σ * ) = V . Recall that any state in S can be selected with positive probability by Nature. If the initial alternative in s 0 , say x 0 , is an element of V , the period-1 challenger oers a policy, say y, which is always rejected. Inspection of (2)- (3) indeed reveals that y is accepted if and only if there is a majority coalition of voters who all prefer f (y) to f x 0 . But this is impossible since f x 0 and f (y) both belong to V which is internally stable.
Suppose now that x 0 , is not a member of V . This implies the set N 0 ⊆ N of voters who prefer f x 0 to x 0 is a majority coalition. According to (1), the challenger oers f x 0 ∈ V and wins (condition (3)). She is then retained and reenacts f x 0 in all subsequent periods (condition (2)). This proves that σ * is absorbing and S (σ * ) = V .
We now turn to the denition of the threshold δ 0 . For each i ∈ N , let
, and
We then dene δ 0 as
Assume now that min i∈N δ i > δ 0 . To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we need to show that σ * is a stage-undominated SMPE. We do so in two easy-to-prove steps. Claim 1: For every i ∈ N , and all states (ι, x) and (c, y) 
. By construction, for every i ∈ N and every (ι, x) ∈ S,
Suppose rst that y = f (x). As δ i > δ 0 , inequality (5) holds if and only if u i (f (y)) − ι, x) . If x belongs to V , internal stability implies that for every y ∈ X there is no majority coalition whose members all strictly prefer f (y) to x = f (x). As a result, any platform announcement including σ * c (ι, x) = f (x) = x is optimal for c and, consequently, she has no protable deviation.
If x does not belong to V , then c can either conform to σ * c by announcing f (x), or deviate by announcing any other alternative. From conditions (1)-(3), her payo from announcing f (x) is 1/ (1 − δ c ) (i.e. she gets elected forever). As this is the highest payo she can possibly obtain, she has no protable deviation from σ * c . By the one-shot deviation principle, Claims 1 and 2 establish that σ * is a stageundominated SMPE, thus completing the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let T = (X, R) be a tournament, and let σ be a stage-undominated SME of Γ ∈ G(T )
Suppose, contrary to the statement of the lemma, that S(σ) does not satisfy internal stability. This implies that there are two alternatives in S(σ), say x and y, such that xRy.
By denition of S(σ), states (c, x) and (c, y) are xed points of τ σ for each c in {α, β}. An immediate consequence of xRy is therefore that there is a majority coalition M such that
for each i ∈ M . But this implies that candidate β could announce x and gain oce forever in state (α, y); a contradiction with σ being a stage-undominated SME of Γ.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let T = (X, R) be a tournament. To prove Lemma 2, we need to show that, for every Γ ∈ G(T ), there existsδ ∈ [0, 1) such that the following statement is true whenever 
As a consequence, every majority coalition M includes a voter i M who, in state ι 0 ,x , is strictly better-o retaining the incumbent when the challenger announces y 1 . As σ is a stage-undominated SMPE, σ i M ι 0 ,x , y 1 = ι 0 . This is a contradiction with τ σ ι 0 ,x = s 1 .
